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I ndicators of the good health of Spanish economic history include thegrowing number of publications in English, the proliferation in the
number of academic journals within Spain, and the fact that the 1998
International Economic History Congress is to be held in Seville. It is
not possible to provide here a general note on all aspects of recent
research, but this essay offers a critical examination of the major argu-
ments advanced for the slow growth in the Spanish economy over the
century or so before the civil war of 1936-9. The period after 1936 has
been excluded because, although many of the obstacles to development
remained until the 1960s, three excellent surveys of the literature have
recently been published.1 Where possible, English versions of works are
cited, and the essay lists only those Spanish publications which are likely
to be relatively easily obtainable. After considering recent estimates of
economic growth and development, the survey tries to explain the slow
change by looking at three areas: agriculture, industry, and the role of
the state.
I
Although important gaps still exist in knowledge of some basic indicators,
recent work, especially by Carreras and by Prados, makes it possible to
place Spain’s long-run performance in an international context. Thus in
1929 real GDP per head in Spain was lower than that in all of Maddison’s
17 ‘advanced capitalist countries’ except Finland and Japan. By contrast,
the level was probably higher than in Latin American countries, with the
exception of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela.2 Over the period
1850 to 1935, real GDP per head in Spain grew by 1.1 per cent annually,
faster than Italy (0.7 per cent) or Britain (0.8 per cent), but slower than
France or Germany (1.6 per cent).3 However, if the longer period is
considered, from about 1800 to 1950, Spain’s performance was much
worse. Carreras’s conclusion that ‘all the qualitative evidence points to a
dramatic fall of industrial output from the end of the 18th century to
the beginning of the second quarter of the 19th’, appears true for other
1 Fraile, ‘Industrial policy’; Harrison, Spanish economy; Prados and Sanz, ‘Growth’.
2 Maddison, Monitoring, tabs. D-1a-1c.
3 Prados, ‘Gross domestic product’, tab. 12. The figure for Italy refers to 1861-1929.
sectors.4 After 1936, the civil war, the difficult international situation,
and the bizarre policies of the early Franco regime implied that levels of
real GDP per head attained in 1929 were not reached again until 1954.5
Consequently, one estimate suggests that annual growth in per caput
income was only 0.55 per cent between 1800 and 1950, considerably
below that of other west European countries.6
Slow growth was accompanied by a delay in structural change. As late
as 1910, two-thirds of the active population worked in agriculture, and
the sector accounted for about one-third of GDP. Urban centres were
small, with only 10 per cent of the population living in cities of more
than 100,000. Demographic trends were dominated by the appalling
levels of mortality, which as late as 1890 remained almost as high as
those in Russia, some 32 per 1,000. Illiteracy among men was 37 per
cent in 1910, and among women 58 per cent.7 Spanish military recruits
were some of Europe’s shortest, and diets at the turn of the century
were as poor as they had been in England in the 1790s.8
From around 1910 growth rates improved, and the economy experi-
enced significant structural change. Thus while per caput incomes
increased by an annual average of 0.9 per cent between 1850 and 1913,
the figure was 1.7 per cent between 1913 and 1935.9 The active popu-
lation in agriculture fell to 45 per cent of the total in 1930, and its
contribution to GDP declined to about a quarter. Literacy rose to 73
per cent, and mortality fell to 17 per thousand. The political unrest of
the 1930s was produced, therefore, within a society that was changing
rapidly. However, although the gap with the leading European countries
had narrowed, Spain still remained essentially a poor country, with per
caput income similar to that Britain had reached in 1860.10
II
It is usually argued that the poor performance of agriculture was a major
cause of the country’s slow growth prior to 1936,11 but much of the
research over the past decade or so has emphasized the changes that
took place within this sector. The nineteenth-century improvements in
transport and a growing international demand encouraged farmers to
plant vines and olives on previously marginal land, and to introduce
4 Carreras, ‘What can we learn?’, p. 36. The debate over the economic consequences of the loss
of Spain’s colonies in the early nineteenth century is conducted in Fontana, ‘Crisis colonial’; Prados,
‘Pe´rdida del imperio’; Ringrose, Spain.
5 Prados, ‘Gross domestic product’, tab. E.2.
6 Idem, ‘Imperio a nacio´n’, tab. 1.4.
7 Nu´n˜ez, ‘La fuente’, p. 94.
8 For stature, see Go´mez Mendoza and Pe´rez Moreda, ‘Heights and welfare’; Martı´nez Carrio´n,
‘Stature, welfare’; for diet, Simpson, Spanish agriculture, tab. 13.2.
9 Prados, ‘Gross domestic product’, tab. 10.
10 For a comparative vision of Spain’s economic development, see Molinas and Prados, ‘Was
Spain different?’; Tortella, ‘Patterns of economic retardation’.
11 See, for example, Nadal, ‘Failure’, pp. 553-67; Tortella, ‘Agriculture’, pp. 55-9; Sa´nchez-
Albornoz, Espan˜a, esp. pp. 13-24.
better manufacturing equipment.12 From the beginning of the twentieth
century, increasing use was made of chemical fertilizers and harvesting
machinery in cereal production. While livestock numbers stagnated
between 1750 and 1936, there were important variations in the compo-
sition of the national herd, and increasing market orientation by livestock
owners.13 On irrigated land, rice yields were the highest in the world and
were achieved not so much through the intensive use of labour, but
rather from improvements in biological and chemical technologies.14 Like-
wise oranges, which had been a marginal export at the end of the
nineteenth century, became Spain’s leading export commodity by 1929.15
Finally, domestic production of beet allowed Spain to be self-sufficient
in sugar within a couple of years of Cuba’s independence in 1898.16
Yet, despite the ability of Spanish agriculture to feed a growing popu-
lation, it is questionable whether there were significant improvements in
the sector’s labour productivity during the nineteenth century.17 Only
from about 1910 did a combination of changes in farming practices and
an absolute decline in agricultural employment lead to productivity
growth. On the eve of the civil war, agriculture still employed 50 per
cent of the male labour force, and labour productivity was only 44 per
cent of that in France or 39 per cent of that in the UK.18 Despite the
changes in agriculture during this period, economic historians seem to
be correct in regarding this sector as a major cause of economic backward-
ness. The various explanations advanced for this poor performance can
be divided into three broad areas: poor resource endowments, inefficient
property rights, and the distortion of factor markets as a result of
tariff protection.
The agricultural advances achieved in northern Europe during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were irrelevant to Spain, as approxi-
mately 90 per cent of its land suffered from summer drought.19 By
contrast, conditions had long proved ideal for the production of merino
wool and, during the period under consideration here, crops such as
wine, olive oil, and citrus fruits also thrived. Although agricultural produce
accounted for about two-thirds of exports on the eve of the civil war,
farmers found strict limits to switching resources out of uncompetitive
cereals and into these export crops.20 In the case of wine and olive oil,
abundant supplies of land and cheap labour led to low entry costs for
producers everywhere in the Mediterranean region. This, together with
12 Pan-Montojo, La bodega, pp. 173-96; Zambrana, Crisis, pp. 53-69, 136-60.
13 Garcı´a Sanz, ‘Ganaderı´a espan˜ola’.
14 See Piqueras, La agricultura valenciana, pp. 182-6; Garrabou, Un fals dilema, pp. 89-94.
15 Garrabou, Un fals dilema, pp. 98-107; Palafox, ‘Exports’; Calatayud, ‘Los inicios’.
16 Martı´n Rodrı´guez, Azu´car, pp. 340-1.
17 Estimates for agricultural output for the period 1800-1936 can be found in Garrabou and Sanz,
‘Introduccio´n’, pp. 96-139; Grupo de Estudios de Historia Rural, ‘Notas’; Prados, Imperio a nacio´n,
ch. 3; Simpson, Spanish agriculture, ch. 1.
18 O’Brien and Prados, ‘Agricultural productivity’, tab. 6.
19 Tortella, ‘Patterns of economic retardation’, pp. 8-9 and, for the region of Valencia, Garrabou,
Un fals dilema, p. 42.
20 For agricultural exports, see Prados, Comercio exterior; Tena, ‘Spanish foreign sector’, pp. 402-
18; Gallego and Pinilla, ‘Del librecambio’.
the ease of product substitution in international markets, and the high
levels of duty often charged by governments on wines, restricted growth
potential. With oranges, these negative factors were absent, and the crop
enjoyed important backward and forward linkages with the rest of the
economy. However, because the area where oranges could be grown was
limited by climate, they accounted for just 3 per cent of agricultural final
output in 1930.21
The transformation of property rights in land was effected more slowly
than in many countries and, in some areas, remained incomplete until
the very end of the period.22 The ‘liberal’ land reforms of the nineteenth
century saw the abolition of seigneurial jurisdiction, the sheep grazing
association the Mesta (1836), the entail of estates of the nobility (1836-
41), and tithes (1841), and led to the disposal of ecclesiastical and
municipal land (some, but not all of which was in cultivation), equivalent
to perhaps a quarter of the country’s agricultural area.23 But most his-
torians agree that these changes failed to usher in an agricultural revol-
ution, and some have been highly critical of property owners purchasing
more land rather than building up capital.24 However, recent studies have
shown that investment in labour-saving farm machinery was unprofitable
until the twentieth century, while the increase in rents from the 1820s
or 1830s provided a strong incentive to purchase land.25 Farm structure
undoubtedly had a major influence on political economy. The nineteenth-
century property reforms failed to consolidate the family farm, as hap-
pened in France. The interests of small farmers were poorly represented
in government, and demand for state intervention tended to be directed
to price intervention (which benefited the large producers most), rather
than to measures such as cooperatives, or research and development. At
the other extreme, the land reforms also failed to sever the links that
poorer members of society had with the land, which might have produced
a rural exodus such as Britain experienced in the eighteenth century, and
which could have encouraged mechanization.
Finally, the growing integration of international commodity markets in
the late nineteenth century led to increased tariff protection from 1891,
producing some of Europe’s highest food prices. As a result, industry
was forced to pay higher wages than it might have done, and effective
demand for manufactures was squeezed because consumers had to dedi-
cate more of their resources to food.26 Higher cereal prices are also
considered to have discouraged farmers from allocating resources to crops
21 Simpson, Spanish agriculture, ch. 9.
22 For the incompleteness of reforms, see Garcı´a Sanz, ‘La agricultura tradicional’, pp. 30-2;
Villares, Propiedad.
23 See esp. Garcı´a Sanz, ‘La agricultura tradicional’, pp. 7-73; Herr, Rural change, ch. 3; Pe´rez
Picazo, Mayorazgo; Ringrose, Spain, pp. 163-83.
24 See, for example, Nadal, ‘Failure’, p. 566. By contrast, Gutie´rrez Bringas, ‘Productividad’,
p. 512, argues that wheat yields increased by 80% over the period 1752-1903/12.
25 For rents, see Bernal, ‘El latifundio’, pp. 128-30; Robledo, Renta de la tierra, tab. 24; Carmona,
‘Estrategias econo´micas’, p. 70. For the profitability of farm machinery, see Simpson, Spanish
agriculture, ch. 7.
26 Nadal, ‘Failure’, p. 567; Palafox, Atraso econo´mico, pp. 39-40.
which were competitive in international markets, and tariff protection
and currency depreciation are believed to have delayed the rural exodus
until the decade before the First World War.27
III
Spanish industrialization was characterized both by the early appearance
of cotton textiles and by the late development of capital goods industries.
In terms of the Hoffmann index, the ratio of consumers’ to producers’
goods failed to change prior to the First World War. Thus whereas Spain
was at the first stage in 1860, together with countries such as Belgium,
France, Germany, Austria, Russia, and Sweden, in 1910 it was
accompanied by Russia only. Spain entered the second stage belatedly in
the 1920s, and the third stage in the late 1950s and early 1960s.28 In
the words of Nadal, ‘the case of Spain is less that of a latecomer than
that of an attempt, largely thwarted, to join the ranks of the first comers’.29
One explanation frequently offered is the supposed mismanagement of
the country’s mineral resources. The mining legislation of 1868 was in
response to the growing international demand for minerals, and led to
an important inflow of foreign capital and technology, making the sector
the country’s ‘most dynamic in the last quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury’.30 While most would agree with Tortella that the government was
correct in trying to attract capital and technology, the debate on whether
the best terms were obtained from the foreign companies remains as alive
as ever. Harvey and Taylor have argued that the level of profitability of
foreign enterprises in the sector has traditionally been exaggerated because
attention has centred on the activities of a few highly profitable large
companies, rather than the ‘scores of short-lived enterprises that unsuc-
cessfully scoured the length and breadth of Spain in the hope of striking
it rich’.31 However, the continuing strength of Spanish mineral prices
until well into the twentieth century, combined with low taxation and
high evasion, has led to frequent charges that the contribution of mining
companies to development was insufficient.32 Finally, while forward and
backward linkages appear to have been strong in the case of iron ore in
the Basque country, they were much less apparent with other minerals,
especially in the south.33
Another frequent explanation for the slow transformation of industry
27 Sa´nchez Alonso, Emigracio´n espan˜ola, pp. 45-7, 135-42, has argued that migration quickened
significantly after 1904, and this coincides with the strengthening of the peseta. For a modification
of this view, see Simpson, ‘Tariffs’.
28 Nadal, El fracaso, pp. 235-8; Carreras, ‘What can we learn?’, pp. 29-33.
29 Nadal, ‘Failure’, p. 617.
30 Tortella, El desarrollo, pp. 84-5, 185. For mining legislation, see Escudero, ‘Leyes mineras’.
Between 1876 and 1900, Spain produced 40% of the world’s mercury, 24% of its lead, and 17%
of its copper. It also accounted for 86% of Europe’s iron ore exports, and 90% of sulphur exports:
Harvey and Taylor, ‘Mineral wealth’, p. 185.
31 Harvey and Taylor, ‘Mineral wealth’, p. 192.
32 For taxation see ibid., p. 205; Escudero, ‘Leyes mineras’, pp. 89-93; idem, ‘Fraude fiscal’.
33 See esp. Nadal, ‘Andalucı´a’.
is the high cost of energy. Spain’s coal was of poor quality, and mining
and transport costs were high. As a result, per caput consumption was
around 300 kilos in 1900, against over 3 tonnes in Belgium or Germany,
or 4 tonnes in the UK.34 However, Tortella has noted that Italy developed
important capital goods industries without domestic coal resources, and
that both of Spain’s major industrial centres, Catalun˜a and the Basque
country, developed away from Spain’s own reserves.35 Imported coal
accounted for half the country’s consumption by the early twentieth
century, before it started to decline, first because of wartime shortages,
and then because of the increasing obligation of Spanish industry to
consume national production.36 At the same time, the growing importance
of hydroelectricity and petroleum helped to diversify the country’s energy
supply, and these sources together accounted for about one-third of
consumption in 1935.37
As in other countries, industry tried to adapt to the high price of
energy. In the case of iron and steel, the Bessemer process, which
favoured locating the industry near ore rather than coal deposits, benefited
the Basque country which enjoyed Europe’s best resources of high grade
non-phosphoric ore.38 This region’s international comparative advantage
in pig iron is shown by the fact that about a quarter of output between
1881 and 1910 was exported. However, from the early twentieth century
the industry turned increasingly to the domestic market and this, accord-
ing to Fraile, can be explained by the existence of optimal conditions for
rent-seeking behaviour (discussed below). This interpretation has been
criticized by Nadal and Sudria`, who argue that technological change was
once again responsible because, if Britain’s attachment to acid steelmaking
technology led to its eventual loss of industrial leadership, Spain suffered
even more, given its much greater dependence on the local hematite ores
and the high cost of energy.39
Spain’s cotton textile industry also adapted to high coal prices, with
the improvement in turbine technology allowing the industry to relocate
away from Barcelona’s coastal plain to the mountainous interior after
1860. By 1914, about 80 per cent of its spindles were water driven, and
the hydraulic energy used was equivalent to roughly a quarter of Barce-
lona’s coal imports.40 Yet if energy costs help to explain the geographical
location of the cotton industry, they cannot explain its failure to compete
in international markets by the early twentieth century.41 Other factors
have to be considered.
The limited size of the domestic market is another explanation for the
34 Pollard, Peaceful conquest, p. 186.
35 Tortella, El desarrollo, pp. 96, 297.
36 Coll and Sudria`, El carbo´n, chs. 3, 5.
37 Sudria`, ‘Energy’, p. 306. For Spain’s electricity industry, see esp. Antolı´n, ‘Electricidad’.
38 Ferna´ndez de Pinedo, ‘Factores te´cnicos’, pp. 254-8. For a general description of Basque
industrialization, see Harrison, ‘Heavy industry’.
39 Nadal and Sudria`, ‘Controversia’, pp. 213-4.
40 Carreras, ‘El aprovechamiento’, pp. 47, 59.
41 Energy represented less than 10% of cotton manufacturing costs: ibid., pp. 44-5; Clark, ‘Cotton
mills’, p. 147.
slow growth of industry frequently found in the literature. Spain, after
Switzerland, was Europe’s most mountainous country, had virtually no
navigable rivers or canals, and its capital, Madrid, was located some 220
miles from the nearest port.42 Social savings models therefore give Spanish
railways a very high rate of return, but throughout the period the country
lagged a considerable distance behind the leading European countries in
terms of such variables as the length of roads or railway lines, cost of
freight, or number of motor vehicles per inhabitant.43 An inefficient and
costly transport system remained a significant factor in the weakness of
market integration throughout the period.
In Spain, as elsewhere, government legislation played a crucial role in
determining the timing of railway construction, and the nature of its
impact on the rest of the economy.44 The Railway Act of 1855, which
provided favourable conditions to attract foreign capital and technology,
including duty free imports of construction material, led to a rapid growth
of the network, but implied that Spain’s small metallurgical and capital
goods industries were little affected, with the economy reaping benefits
almost exclusively through forward linkages. Significant backward linkages
were not forthcoming, however, until after 1891, when the steel and
engineering industries received protection.
Despite these limitations, there can be no doubting that better transpor-
tation and technical change in industry increased the supply of consumer
goods in Spain prior to the First World War. This can be seen in the
example of textiles where consumption per caput, although small in
absolute terms, was reasonably high compared with other European
countries when income levels are considered.45 Recent studies of other
consumer industries, such as tobacco, sugar, flour milling, or paper
making, show similar important changes in productivity and increases in
consumption in the century or so before the First World War.46
The success of Spanish industry in increasing output and productivity
for the domestic market was not matched in exporting. Whereas over the
period 1830-90 the economy became increasingly open, with exports
growing from the equivalent of 2.9 per cent of national income to 13.4
per cent, they then declined to just 7.7 per cent in 1930, a significantly
lower figure than that recorded by most other European countries. Worse
still for manufacturing industry, its share of total exports peaked at 34
per cent in 1914-8, and then fell to just 11.6 per cent by 1931-5.47
42 For the consequences of this in the pre-railway age, see esp. Ringrose, Madrid.
43 Go´mez Mendoza suggests a social saving of about 11% of national income in 1878, and
between 19% and 24% in 1912, although the same author notes the weakness of the model,
especially for a low income country such as Spain: Go´mez Mendoza, Ferrocarriles, pp. 93-7; idem,
‘Transportation’, pp. 98-9.
44 In addition to the works cited above, see Tedde, ‘Las compan˜ias ferroviarias’, pp. 78-85;
Tortella, El desarrollo, pp. 106-14.
45 Nadal, ‘La indu´stria cotonera’, pp. 78-85.
46 See esp. the essays in Nadal and Catala´n, eds., La cara oculta; Comı´n and Mart´n-Acen˜a, eds.,
La empresa.
47 Prados, Imperio a nacio´n, tabs. 4-10, 5-5; Tena, ‘Spanish foreign sector’, tab. 3.
This failure to export manufactured goods is considered further in the
next section.
IV
Spain’s relative backwardness in the period under discussion has led
many economic historians to look for the cause in the failures of govern-
ment,48 and monetary, fiscal, and commercial policies need to be con-
sidered briefly.
The most controversial feature of monetary policy was the suspension
of the convertibility of gold in 1883. According to Martı´n-Acen˜a, Spain
became isolated from the growing international financial markets and the
quantity of foreign capital entering the country declined sharply after
1883, leading to ‘one of the lowest rates of industrialization in Western
Europe’ prior to 1914.49 Furthermore, Tortella argues that because suc-
cessive governments never gave up hope that Spain could rejoin the gold
standard the potentially greater monetary flexibility that the economy
might have enjoyed was not forthcoming, at least until the 1920s.50
Of perhaps greater importance was the failure of government to increase
domestic capital formation. Although government spending as a share of
GDP rose from 6 per cent in 1850 to 10 per cent in 1929, a large part
of the budget was devoted to administration, defence, and the public
debt.51 The persistent failures to bring about budgetary reform, and the
state’s consequent inability to undertake major public works projects can
be explained by endogenous factors—a governing elite which was unwill-
ing to change a fiscal system that would lead to higher taxation.52 Any
advantage that a low tax regime might have had for the business sector
was therefore offset by the low level of public investment in areas such
as transport, health, and education.
Public investment was just one potential area of government activity.
According to Comı´n, ‘as long as it did not imply a cost to the Spanish
Treasury, government intervention knew no bounds, but any project to
develop the private sector which threatened to increase budgetary obli-
gations was rejected.’53 In this respect, Spanish tariffs are usually con-
sidered to be among Europe’s highest,54 and recent work suggests that
nominal protection increased significantly from 1891, with levels being
subsequently maintained by the legislation of 1906 and 1926. However,
no coherent policy can be determined, with textiles, iron, and steel
enjoying relatively greater protection after the 1891 law, but agriculture
48 A useful survey of the recent literature is to be found in Tedde, ed., El estado.
49 Martı´n-Acen˜a, ‘Spain’, pp. 157-60.
50 Tortella, El desarrollo, pp. 149, 331.
51 Comı´n, ‘Public finance’, pp. 544-5. See also Palafox, Atraso econo´mico, pp. 109-21; Cubel,
‘Gasto pu´blico’.
52 See esp. Comı´n, ‘El papel’, p. 303.
53 Idem, ‘Public finance’, p. 522.
54 Palafox, Atraso econo´mico, pp. 23-70.
benefiting from that of 1906, and capital goods from the 1926 legis-
lation.55
From the First World War there was growing direct intervention by
the state in production and commercialization. This in turn increased
the monopolistic tendencies of the economy, raised entrance barriers for
new companies, and led to entrepreneurial laxity.56 In his study of the
steel industry, Fraile shows how four companies accounted for 96 per
cent of capital investment in the 1930s, and this level of domination,
together with the industry’s geographical concentration and the lack of
political democracy, made conditions ideal for rent-seeking activities.57
Fraile argues that the example of the iron and steel industry was far
from unique in Spain, and he himself extended his study to include
cotton textiles.58 Better examples, perhaps, are capital goods industries,
such as electricity, explosives, cement, and mining.59 In each of these,
technology was quickly introduced from abroad or developed in Spain
itself, a few large companies obtained control of the industry, and output
then proceeded to lag behind that of other countries. Where Spain differs
is not in the existence of cartels and pressure groups, but in the level of
control that they were able to exert ‘many years before protection became
general during the Great Depression’.60 This seems, at least in part,
a convincing explanation for the country’s poor performance on the
Hoffmann index.
This process of industrial concentration was aided by the banking
system, as Spain is often considered to be an example for Gerschenkron’s
hypothesis of the role of German ‘universal’ banks in relatively backward
countries. From the early twentieth century, a handful of banks promoted
industry, and owned large quantities of shares, especially in heavy indus-
try. By 1921, directors of the seven largest banks were found on the
boards of 274 corporations, whose combined capital amounted to half
that of the paid-up capital of all Spanish corporations.61 The possible
negative effects of this concentration were compounded by the fact that
Spain on the eve of the civil war had the ‘lowest financial intermediation
level and the most underdeveloped financial system in Western Europe’.62
Although this essay gives only a brief summary of recent works in
economic history, it is clear that no one argument can explain the slow
growth of the Spanish economy. However, the inability of agriculture to
raise productivity, and to release labour prior to the First World War,
were decisive factors. Likewise, the concentration of industry on the
internal market, and the increasing restrictions to competition from the
55 Tena, Proteccio´n nominal.
56 Garcı´a Delgado, ‘Economic nationalism’.
57 Fraile, Industrializacio´n, ch. 2 and p. 132.
58 For criticism of this, see Nadal and Sudria`, ‘Controversia’, pp. 214-6.
59 Fraile, Industrializacio´n, pp. 51, 212.
60 Ibid., p. 143.
61 Rolda´n and Garcı´a Delgado, La formacio´n, cited in Tortella and Palafox, ‘Banking’, p. 87. The
fact that these represented only 7% of all companies shows that close links were forged with
big corporations.
62 Martı´n-Acen˜a, ‘Development’, p. 121.
turn of the twentieth century, appear greater in Spain than in other
European states. Although neither the growth in per caput income nor
the level of structural change in the 30 years prior to the civil war should
be underestimated, Spain remained a poor country in 1936.
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Footnote references
Antol´n, F., ‘Electricidad y crecimiento econo´mico: los inicios de la electricidad en Espan˜a’, Revista
de Historia Econo´mica, 4 (1988), pp. 635-55.
Bernal, A. M., ‘El latifundio y su evolucio´n’, in M. Artola, A. Bernal, and J. Contreras, eds., El
latifundio: propiedad y explotacio´n ss. XVIII-XX (Madrid, 1978), pp. 83-197.
Calatayud, S., ‘Los inicios de la mecanizacio´n en el regadı´o valenciano, 1850-1930’, Areas: Revista
de Ciencias Sociales, 12 (1990), pp. 201-11.
Carmona, J., ‘Las estrategias econo´micas de la vieja aristocracia espan˜ola y el cambio agrario en el
siglo XIX’, Revista de Historia Econo´mica, XIII (1995), pp. 63-88.
Carreras, A., ‘El aprovechamiento de la energı´a hidra´ulica en Catalun˜a, 1840-1920: una aproximacio´n
a su estudio’, Revista de Historia Econo´mica, I (1983), pp. 31-63.
Carreras, A., ‘What can we learn from long-term Spanish economic performance?’, in P. Martı´n-
Acen˜a and J. Simpson, eds., The economic development of Spain since 1870 (Aldershot, 1995),
pp. 24-47.
Clark, G., ‘Why isn’t the whole world developed? Lessons from the cotton mills’, J. Econ. Hist.,
XLVII (1987), pp. 141-73.
Coll, S. and Sudria`, C., El carbo´n en Espan˜a, 1770-1961 (Madrid, 1987).
Comı´n, F., ‘El papel del presupuesto en el crecimiento econo´mico espan˜ol: una visio´n a largo plazo’,
Revista de Historia Econo´mica, XII (1994), pp. 283-314.
Comı´n, F., ‘Public finance in Spain during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’, in P. Martı´n-
Acen˜a and J. Simpson, eds., The economic development of Spain since 1870 (Aldershot, 1995),
pp. 521-60.
Comı´n, F. and Martı´n-Acen˜a, P., eds., La empresa en la historia de Espan˜a (Madrid, 1996).
Cubel, A., ‘Gasto pu´blico y crecimiento econo´mico en la Restauracio´n, 1874-1923’, Revista de
Historia Econo´mica, XI (1993), pp. 49-78.
Escudero, A., ‘Leyes mineras y grupos de presio´n: el coste de oportunidad de la polı´tica fiscal en
la minerı´a espan˜ola’, Revista de Economı´a Aplicada, 1, 3 (1993), pp. 75-94.
Escudero, A., ‘El fraude fiscal en la minerı´a espan˜ola, 1876-1913’, Hacienda Pu´blica Espan˜ola (1994),
pp. 321-41.
Ferna´ndez de Pinedo, E., ‘Factores te´cnicos y econo´micos en el origen de la moderna siderurgia y
la flota vizcaı´na, 1880-1899’, in E. Ferna´ndez de Pinedo and J. L. Herna´ndez Marco, eds., La
industrializacio´n del norte de Espan˜a (Barcelona, 1988), pp. 252-79.
Fontana, J., ‘La crisis colonial en la crisis del Antiguo Re´gimen espan˜ol’, in H. Bonilla, ed., El
sistema colonial en la Ame´rica espan˜ola (Barcelona, 1991), pp. 305-20.
Fraile, P., Industrializacio´n y grupos de presio´n: la economı´a polı´tica de proteccio´n en Espan˜a, 1900-1950
(Madrid, 1991).
Fraile, P., ‘Industrial policy under authoritarian politics: the Spanish case’ (forthcoming).
Gallego, D. and Pinilla, N., ‘Del librecambio matizado al proteccionismo selectivo: el comercio
exterior de productos agrarios en Espan˜a entre 1845 y 1935’, Revista de Historia Econo´mica,
XIV (1996).
Garcı´a Delgado, J. L., ‘Economic nationalism and state intervention’, in N. Sa´nchez Albornoz, ed.,
The economic modernization of Spain, 1830-1930 (New York, 1987), pp. 151-65.
Garcı´a Sanz, A., ‘Crisis de la agricultura tradicional y revolucio´n liberal’, in A. Garcı´a Sanz and R.
Garrabou, eds., Historia agraria de la Espan˜a contempora´nea, 1: cambio social y nuevas formas de
propiedad, 1800-1850 (Barcelona, 1985), pp. 7-99.
Garcı´a Sanz, A., ‘La ganaderı´a espan˜ola entre 1750 y 1865: los efectos de la reforma agraria liberal’,
Agricultura y Sociedad, 72, 1994, pp. 81-119.
Garrabou, R., Un fals dilema: modernitat o endarreriment de l’agricultura valenciana, 1850-1900
(Valencia, 1985).
Garrabou, R. and Sanz, J., ‘Introduccio´n’, in R. Garrabou and J. Sanz, eds., Historia agraria de la
Espan˜a contempora´nea, 2: expansio´n y crisis, 1850-1900 (Barcelona, 1985), pp. 7-191.
Go´mez Mendoza, A., Ferrocarriles y cambio econo´mico en Espan˜a, 1855-1913 (Madrid, 1982).
Go´mez Mendoza, A., ‘Transportation and economic growth, 1830-1930’, in N. Sa´nchez Albornoz,
ed., The economic modernization of Spain, 1830-1930 (New York, 1987), pp. 90-106.
Go´mez Mendoza, A. and Pe´rez Moreda, V., ‘Heights and welfare in Spain, 1900-1930’, in J.
Komlos, ed., The biological standard of living on three continents (Boulder, Colo., 1995), pp. 81-91.
Grupo de Estudios de Historia Rural, ‘Notas sobre la produccio´n agraria espan˜ola, 1891-1931’,
Revista de Historia Econo´mica, 1 (1983), pp. 185-252.
Gutie´rrez Bringas, M. A., ‘La productividad de la tierra en Espan˜a, 1752-1930’, Revista de Historia
Econo´mica, 11 (1993), pp. 505-40.
Harrison, J., ‘Heavy industry, the state, and economic development in the Basque region, 1876-
1936’, Econ. Hist. Rev., 2nd ser., XXXVI (1983), pp. 535-51.
Harrison, J., The Spanish economy: from the civil war to the European Community (Cambridge, 1995).
Harvey, C. E. and Taylor, P., ‘Mineral wealth and economic development; foreign direct investment
in Spain, 1851-1913’, Econ. Hist. Rev., 2nd ser., XL (1987), pp. 185-207.
Herr, R., Rural change and royal finances in Spain at the end of the old regime (Berkeley and Los
Angeles, 1989).
Maddison, A., Monitoring the world economy, 1829-1992 (Paris, 1995).
Martı´n-Acen˜a, P., ‘Development and modernization of the financial system, 1844-1935’, in N.
Sa´nchez Albornoz, ed., The economic modernization of Spain, 1830-1930 (New York, 1987),
pp. 107-27.
Martı´n-Acen˜a, P., ‘Spain during the classical gold standard years, 1880-1914’, in M. D. Bordo and
F. Capie, eds., Monetary regimes in transition (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 135-72.
Martı´n Rodrı´guez, M., Azu´car y descolonizacio´n: origen y desenlace de una crisis agraria en la vega de
Granada: el ‘ingenio de San Juan’, 1882-1904 (Granada, 1982).
Martı´nez Carrio´n, J. M., ‘Stature, welfare, and economic growth in nineteenth-century Spain: the
case of Murcia’, in J. Komlos, ed., Stature, living standards, and economic development (Chicago,
1994), pp. 76-89.
Molinas, C. and Prados de la Escosura, L., ‘Was Spain different? Spanish historical backwardness
revisited’, Exp. Econ. Hist., 26 (1989), pp. 385-402.
Nadal, J., ‘The failure of the industrial revolution in Spain, 1830-1914’, in C. M. Cipolla, ed., The
Fontana economic history of Europe, 4, 2 (Glasgow, 1973), pp. 532-626.
Nadal, J., El fracaso de la revolucio´n industrial en Espan˜a, 1814-1913 (Barcelona, 1975).
Nadal, J., ‘Andalucı´a, paraı´so de los metales no ferrosos’, in Historia de Andalucı´a, 7 (Barcelona,
1984), pp. 366-490.
Nadal, J., ‘La indu´stria cotonera’, in Enciclope`dia Catalana: histo`ria econo`mica de la Catalunya
contempora`nia (Barcelona, 1991), pp. 13-158.
Nadal, J. and Catala´n, J., eds., La cara oculta de la industrializacio´n espan˜ola (Madrid, 1994).
Nadal, J. and Sudria`, C., ‘La controversia en torno al atraso econo´mico espan˜ol en la segunda
mitad del siglo XIX (1860-1913)’, Revista de Historia Industrial, 3 (1993), pp. 199-227.
Nu´n˜ez, C. E., La fuente de la riqueza: educacio´n y desarrollo econo´mico en la Espan˜a contempora´nea
(Madrid, 1992).
O’Brien, P. and Prados de la Escosura, L., ‘Agricultural productivity and European industrialization,
1890-1980’, Econ. Hist. Rev., XLV (1992), pp. 514-36.
Palafox, J., ‘Exports, internal demand, and economic growth in Valencia’, in N. Sa´nchez Albornoz,
ed., The economic modernization of Spain, 1830-1930 (New York, 1987), pp. 268-89.
Palafox, J., Atraso econo´mico y democracia: la Segunda Repu´blica y la economı´a espan˜ola, 1892-1936
(Barcelona, 1991).
Pan-Montojo, J. L., La bodega del mundo: la vid y el vino en Espan˜a, 1800-1936 (Madrid, 1994).
Pe´rez Picazo, M. T., El mayorazgo en la historia econo´mica de la regio´n murciana: expansio´n, crisis y
abolicio´n (s. XVII-XIX) (Madrid, 1990).
Piqueras, J., La agricultura valenciana de exportacio´n y su formacio´n histo´rica (Madrid, 1985).
Pollard, S., Peaceful conquest: the industrialization of Europe, 1760-1970 (Oxford, 1981).
Prados de la Escosura, L., Comercio exterior y crecimiento en Espan˜a, 1826-1913 (Madrid, 1982).
Prados de la Escosura, L., De imperio a nacio´n: crecimiento y atraso econo´mico en Espan˜a, 1780-1930
(Madrid, 1988).
Prados de la Escosura, L., ‘La pe´rdida del imperio y sus consecuencias econo´micas en Espan˜a’, in
L. Prados de le Escosura and S. Amaral, eds., La independencia americana: consecuencias econo´micas
(Madrid, 1993), pp. 253-300.
Prados de la Escosura, L., ‘Spain’s gross domestic product, 1850-1993’, Universidad Carlos III de
Madrid, Working paper, 1995-05/6.
Prados de la Escosura, L. and Sanz, J. C., ‘Growth and macroeconomic performance in Spain,
1939-93’, in N. Crafts and G. Toniolo, eds., Economic growth in Europe since 1945 (Cambridge,
1996), pp. 355-87.
Ringrose, D. R., Madrid and the Spanish economy, 1560-1850 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983).
Ringrose, D., Spain, Europe and the ‘Spanish miracle’, 1700-1900 (Cambridge, 1996).
Robledo, R., La renta de la tierra en Castilla la Vieja y Leo´n, 1836-1913 (Madrid, 1984).
Rolda´n, S. and Garcı´a Delgado, J. M., La formacio´n de la sociedad capitalista en Espan˜a, 1914-1920
(Madrid, 1973).
Sa´nchez-Albornoz, N., Espan˜a hace un siglo: una economı´a dual (Madrid, 1977).
Sa´nchez Alonso, B., Las causas de la emigracio´n espan˜ola (Madrid, 1995).
Simpson, J., Spanish agriculture: the long siesta, 1765-1965 (Cambridge, 1995).
Simpson, J., ‘Did Spanish tariffs stifle Spanish agriculture before 1936?’, Eur. Rev. Econ. Hist.,
1 (1997).
Sudria`, C., ‘Energy as a limiting factor to growth’, in P. Martı´n-Acen˜a and J. Simpson, eds., The
economic development of Spain since 1870 (Aldershot, 1995), pp. 268-309.
Tedde, P., ‘Las compan˜ias ferroviarias en Espan˜a, 1855-1935’, in M. Artola, ed., Los ferrocarriles en
Espan˜a, 1844-1943 (Madrid, 1978), 2, pp. 9-354.
Tedde, P., ed., El estado y la modernizacio´n econo´mica (Madrid, 1996).
Tena, A., ‘The Spanish foreign sector, 1885-1985’, in P. Martı´n-Acen˜a and J. Simpson, eds., The
economic development of Spain since 1870 (Aldershot, 1995), pp. 402-18.
Tena, A., Fue importante la proteccio´n? La medicio´n de la proteccio´n en Espan˜a, 1870-1930 (Madrid,
forthcoming).
Tortella, G., ‘Agriculture: a slow-moving sector, 1830-1935’, in N. Sa´nchez Albornoz, ed., The
economic modernization of Spain, 1830-1930 (New York, 1987), pp. 42-62.
Tortella, G., ‘Patterns of economic retardation and recovery in south-western Europe in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries’, Econ. Hist. Rev., XLVII (1994), pp. 1-24.
Tortella, G., El desarrollo de la Espan˜a contempora´nea: historia econo´mica de los siglos XIX y XX
(Madrid, 1994).
Tortella, G. and Palafox, J., ‘Banking and industry in Spain, 1918-1936’, J. Eur. Econ. Hist., 13
(1984), pp. 81-111.
Villares, R., La propiedad de la tierra en Galicia, 1500-1936 (Madrid, 1982).
Zambrana, J. F., Crisis y modernizacio´n del olivar espan˜ol, 1870-1930 (Madrid, 1987).
